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In  order  to  capture  the  complex  notion  of  an  economy' a  competitive 
position,  aomething  .more  than  aummary  indicators  - which  cannot  be 
interpreted too literally - is required.  As  well aa monitoring a  broad 
range  of  coat  and  price  indicators,  a  degree  of  interpretation  and 
overall analyaia ia necessary.  ~he purpose of this note is not to solve 
the methodological  problem of measuring competitiveneas,  but  rather to 
give  an  overview of the  aalient  facts  provided  by  simple  treatment  of 
the  -.oat  eaaily  acceasible  information  on  nc countries,  the  us  and 
Japan,  after a  abort methodological _presentation. 
1. OOKPB'l'ITIVBRBSS  :  WBA~ DOBS  IT NBA1f  Atm  BOW  SHOULD  I~ BB  MBASURBD  ? 
The  .extent  to  which  .a  country  is  competitive·  is  reflected  in  the 
ability to increase its share of export markets,  or to sustain a  higher 
growth rate without  a  deterioration in its current account balance. 
COmpetitiveness  variations  in  one· direction  or  another  will  tend  to 
balance  aupply  and  demand  in  the  economy.  For  example,  some 
deterioration  in  competitiveness  is  necessary  when  domestic  demand  is 
growing  very  rapidly  as  a  result  of  private  sector  expectations  of 
structural  improvement  or  economic  "catching  up".  However,  if  demand 
disturbances  are  due  to  in.appropriate budgetary  policies,  the  response 
should be to correct those  policies rather than  induce  compensation  by 
changes  in relative cost positions. 
One  of  the  most  widely  used  indicators  of  competitiveness  is based  on 
unit  labour  costs  (ULCM)  in  the  manufacturing  sector  (used  as  a  proty 
for  the  sector exposed to the external  competition).  It is calculated 
as  the  ratio  of  manufacturing  unit  labour  cost  indices  in  the  home 
country  to  manufacturing  unit  labour  cost  indices  in  its  trading 
partners,  with  all  data  expressed  in  a  common  currency.  For  the  home 
~ountry, it corresponds to the product  of the ratio of  the unit  labour 
costs  indices  in  respective  national  currencies  by  the  index  of  the 
nominal  (effec~ive)  exchange  rate  of  this  country's  currency  against 
its  partners'  currencies.  .This  indicator  is  also  called  a  real 
exchange rate  index.  The  implicit  assumptio_n  behind this  indicator is · 
that,  since  traded  goods  prices  are  linked  by  strong  international 
competition,  developments  in relative unit  labour  costs  are  indicative 
of  changes  in  relative  profitability  in  the  traded  goods'  sector. 
Movements  in  such  an  indicator  for  any  given  country  should  point  to 
changes  in the incentives to produce manufactured  goods  in this country 
relative to its trading partners. - 2  -
Interpreting ULCM  aa  a ..  asure of relative profitability is however  an 
arbitrary  simplification,  which  is misleading  in  as  much  as  relative 
profitability  is  influenced  by  other  factors.  For  example,  product 
differentiation  across  countries,  structural  differences  in  their 
material inputs and especially differences in domestic  input prices may 
affect  profitabilit:)'  in  a  given  country  with  respect  to  the  others. 
Thus,  a  rise in the·output  price of traded goods  supplied  by the  home 
country relative to the  foreign  price  need  not  necessarily  indicate  a 
deterioration  in competitiveness,  to the extent that it may  reflect  a 
shift in external demand preferences,  or to the extent that the quality 
of industrial specialization allows it to pass domestic  cost  increases 
on to ita trading partners without  any profit squeeze.· Another typical 
·case is a  country with unchanged relative unit labour costa but showing 
a  decrease in ita relative output price (or an increase in ita relative 
input  prices)  provoking  a  .reduction  in  ita  relative  value-added 
deflator. Contrary to conventional interpretation, this country has not 
improved ita competitiveness for existing production since it registers 
a  squeeze  in  profit  margins  with  respect  to  its competitors.  It is, 
therefore,  necessary  to  examine  relative  profitability  by  looking 
simultaneously at ULCM  indicators and at adequate price indicators.  The 
.beat  price  indicator  for  this  purpose  is,  of  course,  the deflator  of 
manufacturing  value-added  (PVA).  The  PVA  takes  into  account  not  only 
output-price  variations,  but  also,  negatively,  input  price  movements. 
so,  a  change in the specific terms of trade of the manufacturing sector 
of  one  country,  which  will  affect profit margins,  should  be  correctly 
reflected in a  change  in the value-added deflator. 
Accordingly,  the preferred competitiveness indicator might be the ratio 
of  the  relative unit  labour  costs to the relative price of  the  value-
added,  since  this  ind.icator  gives  the  evolution  of  labour's  share  in 
value-added  for  the  home  manufacturing  sector with  respect  to that  of 
ita  foreign  competitors,  which  corresponds  also  to  a  measure  of 
relative profit margins  (its complement).  Of  course,  this  indicator  is 
also imperfect  : 
1)  it is an ex-post indicator,  i.e. it refl~cts the relative cash-
flow  position of existing output capacities  ; 
2)  it does  not  exhaust  the  possible  factors  which  may  affect  the 
rate of return,  auch  as  differences  in the cost of  capital,  in 
capital  intensity  or  in  the  elasticity of  factor  substitution 
(but  whose  consideration  woutd  result  in  an  excessive 
complication of the analysis)  ; 
3)  it suffers  from  some  weaknesses  in  the  comparability  of  data 
across countries. 
The  following  analysis  starts  with  a  short  presentation  ot' the  trade 
performances  and  imbalances,  which  are  the  results  of  global 
developments.  Then  the most  commonly  used  ex-post  cost-competit1veness 
indicator of the traded sector·- that is the relative unit labour costa 
in  manufacturing  sector  (ULCM)  is  examined.  As  an  alternative 
indicator,  relative  consumer  price  indices,  to  which  exchange  rate 
operators  usually  refer  to  as  a  benchmark  for  developments  in 
purchasing  power  parities,  is  also  presented.  Finally,  the  note  tries 
to  overcome  some  of  the  traditionnal  difficulties  with  ULCM,  such  as 
differences  in other  domestic  costs  or  in the  path  of  input  costs,  or 
shifts in external  terms  of  trade,  by  using  the  relative  labour  share 
developments  as  a  synthetical  indicator  of  ex-post  profitability.  A 
tentative  comparison  of  absolute  levels  of  total  wage  costs  per 
employee  and  value added per employee  closes the analysis. - 3  -
2.  CURRENT  ACOOONT  BALANCES  AND  'l'RADB  PBRFORJIARCBS  (TABLB  1  UD 
CHART  1). 
Other  factors  than  changes  in  competitiveness  may  account  for  the 
evolution  of  trade  balances  and . performance•.  Changes  in  relative 
cyclical  poaitiona  (income  effects),  relative  growth  in  productive 
potential  (&UPJ)lY  effects  and  output  gap)  and  competitiveness 
(relative-price effecta)  are· the  three main  categories  of  determining 
factoJ;'s. 
In  more  recent  yeara,  relative  demand  growth  (cycle)  seema  to  have 
played a  major. role in ahaping the external positions of a  majority of 
induatriali&ad countriea.  Since 1987,  the relative dynamism  in domestic 
demand enable• 'three groupe of countriea to be diatinguishad  a  one with 
a  higher domeatic demand  growth,  another with a  lower growth,  and those 
whose  growth  hovered  around the  average  for the group  as  a  whole  (see 
table 1). 
TABLB  1 
INCOME  EFFECT  AND  TRADE  PERFORMANCE  IN  1992  AGAINST  1987 
1. Countries with a  higher dOID&stic  demand growth 
Japan  Spain  Portugal Germany  Belgium Greece  EG  12 
a. Relative Domestic 
Demand  (1987  •  100) 
b.  Market Share in 
volum$  (1) 
(1987  - 100) 
c.  Current Balance 
(\ of GOP,  variation 
against  1.987) 
114.8 
92.5 
- 0.4 
112.5  113.4  104.5 
105.4  106.7  94.8 
- 3.6  - 1.7  - 3.7 
2.  COuntries with a  lower domestic demand  growth 
a.  Relative Domestic  Demand 
(1987 = 100) 
b.  Market  Share in volume  (1) 
(1987  - 100) 
c.  Current Balances(\ of GOP, 
variation against 1987) 
Denmark 
88  .• 7 
102.2 
+  5.8 
USA 
92.0 
122.3 
+  2.5 
3. COuntries with a  neutral domestic demand growth 
104.2 
93.8 
o.o 
Netherlands  France  Italy 
a.  Relative Domestic  Demand 
(1987 = 100) 
b.  Market  Share in volume  (1) 
(1987  = 100) 
c.  Current Balances(\ of GOP, 
(variation against  1987) 
99.5 
100.1 
+  2.7 
99.7  101.0 
105.6  96.0 
+  0.3  - 2.2 
102.2  102.8 
88.8  94.7 
- 0.3  - -1.3 
UK 
95.6 
90.9 
0.5 
Ireland 
101.5 
118.2 
+  5.4 
(1)  Export  volume  of  a  country,  compared  to  the  export  volumes  of  industrial 
countries. 
Sources  :  Commission  services 
I.M.F.  - International Financial Statistics In tbe firat group,  domestic demand  growth was  14.9  '  higher  for Japan 
than  for  the  average  of  ita  19  industrial  partners,  13.4  '  for 
Portugal,  12.5  \  for  Spain,  4.5  '  for  (Western)  Carmany,,  4.2  '  for 
Belgium,  2.2  \  for Greece and 2.8 '  for the Community  as a  whole.  These 
growth  differentials  ahould,  ceteris paribus,  explain  a  deterioration 
of the·current balances  and trade market  shares  in these countries,  as 
a  function  of  their  respective  income-elasticities.  Indeed,  the  table 
below  shows  that  it is  the  case  in  all  these  countries  for  current 
balances,  and also for market shares except for Portugal and Spain.  For 
these  two  countries,  the  two  other  factors  of  trade  performance  were 
thua playing a  more  tmportant role than income effects. 
l'or the tMIOOnd  group  (Denmark,  the US  and the UK)  with a  lower rate of 
growth,  the  same  argument  tmpliea  that  income  effects  ahould,  ceteris 
paribus,  improve trade performances and current balances.  It ia indeed 
the  case  for  two  of  the  three  countries  of  group  2:  only  the  UK 
registered  a  deterioration  of  both  current  account  and  market  shares 
indicators  in  spite  of  a  significant  differential, in  ita  domestic 
demand  with reapect to the other industrial countries.  This  implies  •& 
priori• a  loss of competitiveness for the British economy. 
In the third .group  (France,  the  Netherlands,  Ireland  and  Italy),  the 
cumulative  income  effects  were  rather  neutral  during  the  1987-1992 
period.  Only  the  Netherlands  registers  also  a  neutral  market  share 
performance;  France and Ireland show  significant progress,  whilst Italy 
· looses  market  share.  This  indication  of  an  improvement  of 
cqmpetitiveneaa  for  France  and  Ireland,  as  well  as  of  a  deterioration 
in Italian competitiveness,  is confirmed by the developments of current 
account balances. 
The  combination of indicators presented in the inserted table,  suggests 
that  the  competitiveness  factor  should  at  the  most  explain  only  that 
part of the trade  performances  which  cannot  be  accounted  for  by  income 
effects.  So,  the'dramatic recovery of market  shares by  the us  exporters 
cannot  be  imputed  solely  to  competitiveness,  since  the  cyclical  gap 
will  also  have  played  a  major  role.  The  same  is  true  in  explaining  a 
part of the corresponding deterioration in trade performance  for Japan, 
the  Community  and  Germany.  Intuitively,  however,  it  seems  that  the 
deterioration of current balances and market  shares in Japan are rather 
modest  relative to the  importance  of  the  income  effects,  indicating  a 
possible partial counter-action by the other factors. 
For  Community  countries,  possible  losers  of  competitiveness  - other 
than Germany  - would  be the UK,  Italy,  and  Greece.  The  possible winners 
would  be,  at  this  stage  of  the  analysis,  Portugal,  Ireland,  Spain, 
France,  and the Netherlands. Export Performance  <1 > 
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Before  comparing  the  components  of  relative  trade  performance 
unexplained  by  income-effects  with  the· possible  effects  of  apecific 
competitiveness  indicatora,  .it  is  worth  mentioning  some  additional 
features  of  tbe  O:  unity•  •  external  trade,  drawing  on  a  previous 
publication(l) of the COmmission Services. 
Between  1987  and  1990,  extra-Community  imports  of  manufactures,  in 
volume  terms,  have  grown  more  rapidly  (32.4  ')  than  intra-Community 
imports  (21.4 •>·  In particular,  this phenomena  is also  t~ue for  high-
tech  products:  BC  'imports  from  the  rest  of  the  world  have  increased 
more  (39.1 •>  than the intra-Be  ~porta of the same products  (32 ')· On 
the export aide during the same period,  total growth of extra-Be export 
of manufactures,  in volume,  baa been rather modest  (5.9 \),  well  below 
the expansion of intra-Be exports  (23.3 \). Also  in the field of high-
tech  products,  the  total  progression  in ·volume  terms  of  extra-BC 
exports  (13.2  •)  is  leas  than  half  of  the  progression  of  intra-Be 
exports  (31.2 ,,. These elements are an additional information pointing 
towards  a  weakening of competitiveness of the community as  a  whole via-
l-via the Rest of the World. 
3.  DBSCRIP.l'l:OR  OP  RBLBVA1ft ~S  J:R  RBLATJ:VB  DROPACTUIURG  UNIT  LABOUR 
COSTS. 
In this section,  the trend  in relative manufacturing unit  labour costs· 
in the three main  industrial countries  and  in the  Community  as  a  bloc 
ia· examined.  This  examination  is  baaed  on  the  nominal  effective 
exchange  rates  of  each  of  their  respective  currencies  (or  group  of 
currencies)  via-l-via  the  other  industrialized  countries,  deflated  by 
unit  labour  costa  in  manufacturing.  Intra-Community  developments  are 
then  addressed  using  the  same  indicator  for  each  Member  .state,  but 
calculated against the  (other)  ERM  currencies. 
3.1.  Relative  unit  labour  cost  in  the  manufacturing  sector  of  the 
United States,  Japan,  Germany and the Community  (Charts .2  and 3). 
According  to  the  relative  unit  labour  costs  indices,  the  competitive 
position  of  the  US  manufacturing  sector  has  substantially  improved 
since the  time  of  the  Louvre  accord  (first quarter  of  1987).  The  last 
quarter  of  1992  registers  a  relative  cost  improvement  of  18.8  \ 
(estimated)  in  comparison  to  the  first  quarter  of  1987.  Such  real 
exchange  rate  depreciation  results  from  the  combination  of  an  11.5  \ 
nominal  depreciation  of  the  effective  exchange  rate  of  the  dollar 
-despite the upsurge in the nominal  exchange.rate of the dollar at the 
end  of  1992(2)  - and  a  6.5  \  reduction  in  the  US  unit  labour  costs 
vis-l-vis. the 19 other countries unit labour·costs measured  in national 
currencies. 
(1)  Main  Features  of  Community  Trade.  Study  N°4,  European  Economy, 
n°  50,  December  1991. 
(2)  It  is  only  with  the  level  reached  during  the  first  half  of 
January  1993  that  the  nominal  effecti~e  exchange  rate  of  the 
dollar  h~s  recovered  its  level  of  mid-1991. - 6  -
Since  1987,  the competitive positions of Japanese  manufacturing sector 
registered mainly  two  contrasted  periods  :  first  a  strong  ~provement 
until  the  second  quarter  of  1990,  and  since  then  a  steady 
deterioration,  which put the Japanese relative ULCM  11  '  higher than at 
the time of the Louvre agreement. 
During the first period,  the sharp drop in relative ULCK  for Japan,  was 
the combined  result of  a  fall in the  nominal  exchange  rate of the  yen 
(- 6,1  \  fom  the  Louvre  level)  and  a  reduction  in  the  relative  unit 
labour  costa  Maaured  in  national  currencies  (-I 9,9  \).  During  the 
second  period,  the  increase  of  ULCM  in  common  currency  amounted  to 
33  \ 1  aa a  result of both a  nominal  appreciation of the yen against the 
19  other  currencies  (26,2  \)  and  an  increase  in  the ·relative  unit 
labour costa measured in national currencies  (5,4 \).  In a  longer  te~ 
perspective, the yen ahowa  a  trend of real appreciation(l). 
The  German  eanufacturing  sector  bas  lost competitiveness  since  1987  : 
the relative unit  labour coats  for the  fourth quarter of  1992  ahow  an 
increase  of  14.6  \ 1  the  bulk  of  which  is  due  to  the  nominal 
appreciation of the DM.  However,  the strengthening of the real exchange· 
rata of the DM  ia entirely due to developments which occurred after the 
collapse of the centrally-planned economies of Eastern Europe.  Between 
the trough of the third quarter of 1989  and the fourth. quarter of 1992, 
the  real  appreciation  of  the  DM  amounts  to  16.5  \,  of  which  12.2  \ 
relates to a  nominal  appreciation.  A comparison of the position of the 
last  available  data  with  its  corresponding  value  along  the  long-run 
trend  would  point  to  the  real  overvaluation  of  the  DM.  As  will  be 
explained  in section 7,  such  an overshooting is the ineluctable result 
of relative ..  cro-economic developments. 
UNIT  LABOUR  alSTS  IN  UANUFACTURING  INll.JSTRY 
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·  ( 3)  The  1980-1991  trend  of  the  real  exchange  rate  of  the  yen, 
estimated by  linenr regression,  shows  an  average  growth rate of 
4. 3  \  per  year.  If  the  structural  factors  underlying  this 
rising trend were  to be still operating,  the yen  would still be 
under its extrapolated value. 
\ - 7  -
For  the  Community  currencies  taken  as  a  group  via-l-vis  third 
currencie·s,  the  real  appreciation  in  the  fourth  quarter  of  1992 
compared  to the first quarter of  1987  amounts  to 10.4 ,, after  a  peak 
of  17.8  t  in  the  third  quarter  of  1992.  This  6.3  '  drop  of.  the 
COmmunity's  unit  labour  costa  in  the  fourth  quarter  is  due,  to  the 
appreciation  of  the  dollar  combined  with  the  impact  of  the 
depreciations  of  the  pound,  the. lira  and  the  peseta.  However,  in 
contrast to the German  position,  the Community's  competitiveness losses 
of  10.4  '  with respect to the Louvre  period  comes  more  from  a  rise in 
relative  costa  in  national  currencies  (7.5  t)  than  from  nominal 
exchange  rate  appreciation  (2.7  t).  No  significant  trend  can  be 
detected for the whole period starting frqm the early eighties. 
The  weakening  in  the  competitive  position  of  the  Community's 
manufacturing  sector  can  be  examined  bilaterally with  respect  to  the 
United  States  and  Japan.  Chart  3  shows  the  relative  developnents  (in 
common  currency)  of  US  and  Japanese unit  labour  costa  with  respect  to 
those of  the  community.  The  cumulative  Community  losses  in the  fourth 
quarter  of  1992  relative  to  the  •Louvre  quarter•,  are  around  20  ' 
against  the  United  States  and  1.3  '  against  the  yen.  In  the  third 
quarter  of  1992,  these  losses  reached  27  '  against  the  us  and  12  ' 
against the yen. 
CHART  3 
lliiT LAIDJR  alSlS.- IN  tMNUFACTURI~ INil.ISTRY 
Ms-A-VlS EC12.8701•100J 
200 ..------------~------:--------=-------,  200 
150 
100 
.  ··.·. 
1980 
.. .. .. . 
. .  .  . . 
1082 
.  .....  .. 
..  .  .  . .  . . 
.  ·.  .  .. 
1!10 
100 .  ~ 
- 8  -
3.2 DevelopaeDta in illtra-cc a  ~nity coapatitiveneaa  (Charta  4  anc:l  5). 
In  the  developments  of the  relative unit  labour  costs  for  each  Member 
State  against  the  other  ERM  participants(S),  for  the  period  under 
review  two  sub-periods  may  be  di
1stinguished  :  1987  to  mid-1992,  and 
after  mid-1992.  The  BRM  members  themselves  may  be  grouped  in  two 
categories  1  the  seven countries which  have  participated in the  narrow 
band  of  the  ERM  since  the  beqinning,  and  the  five  others.  Each  sub-
group  is  presented  on  the  same  chart,  since  they  generally  present 
common  developments throughout the whole period. 
The seven countries of the initial narrow band  show  stable or declining 
relative unit labour coats until mid-1992;  during the second sub-period 
their  competitiveness  ia  reduced  by  the  upward  movement  in  their 
relative unit  labour. coats essentially due to the ERM  realignments  and 
floating• of september and November  1992.  The  five other countries show 
mostly  divergent  unit  labour  coats  developnenta  with,  in  moat  cases, 
important  losses  of  competitiverieas,  followed  by ·some  adjustments  in 
four of them,  first by labour coat moderation in national currency and, 
_finally for three of them by aignificant parity realignments. 
Amongst  the seven countries,  some  divergences are to be highligthed.  In 
both  sub-periods,  German  relative unit  labour  costa  rose  significantly 
against  the six other countries of the first  sub-group.  At  the  end of 
1992,  the cumulative  losses of competitiveness of  German  manufacturing 
sector,  measured  bilateral  y  against  these  partners,  reached  7.  8  \ 
against  Danish  manufacturing  sector,  11  \  against  Belgium,  13.2  \ 
against  France,  16.3  \  against  the  Netherlands,  and  23.7  \  against 
Ireland(6).  As  such  an  evolution  is  not  due  to  parity  realignments, 
it results  essentially  from  wage  slippage  in  Germany  throughout  the 
_whole  period  and  very  good  performances. in  the  six  other  countries· 
(wages moderation and  increase of productivity). 
Considering the  ~ncreases of unit  labour costs of all the  ERM  members, 
at  mid-1992,  the  competitiveness  gains  of  the  partners  of  Germany  in 
the  first  group  reached  6. 7  %  for  Danemark,  8  %  for  Belgium,  12.2  % 
for  France,  15.2  \  for  the  Netherlands,  and  21.1  %  for  Ireland.  The 
successive  realignements  of  the  second  half  of  1992  reduced  these 
cumulative  gains  to only  1.1  \ · for  Danemark,  3. 5  %  for  Belgium,  7. 6  \ 
for  France,  10.6 \  for the Netherlands,  and  17.4  % for  Ireland. 
Amongst  the five other Community  members,  that  have  not been within the 
narrow  band  from  the beginning,  all witnessed  a  period of  weakening of 
their cost-competitiveness but there are large differences  amongst  them 
concerning the intensity and the duration of  such  a  period,  as well  as 
the  parameters  used  to  absorb  the  cost  differentials.  Only  Portugal 
( 5)  The  qefinition  of  the  ERM  members  is  the  same  throughout  the 
whole period and  includes eleven countries. 
( 6)  Due  to  the  lack  of  value  added  for  the  Irish  manufacturing 
sector,  Irish data for manufacturing productivity are not  fully 
comparable  with  the  other  country  data,  and  the  proxy  used 
(output  index)  could  lead  to  an  exagerated  measure  of 
productivity growth. - 9 
did  not  display  any  real  depreciation  of  its  currency  in  the  fourth 
quarter of  1992,  as  the  November  devaluation of the  escudo  in the  ERM 
amounted  to  only  1  '  in  effective  terms.  Its  cumulative  losses 
amounted  to  42  '  in  comparison  to  the  base  period  (first  quarter  of 
1987).  As  a  result of two  devaluations  Spain  reduced the real exchange 
rate appreciation  registered  since the beginning  of  1987  (whose  level 
at that time  was  an  all-time  low of the peseta's real  exchange  rate), 
from  33  '·in mid-1992  to  25  '  for  the  fourth  quarter of  1992  (i.e.  a 
real depreciation of only  5.8 ')· Thus,  Spain  and  Portugal  show  clear 
lo•••s of competitiveness  according to developments  in their-relative-
price effects.  However,  as it was  mentioned  in section  2  above,  these 
two  countries  have  registered  significant  market  share  progress  (see 
Table  1)  in spite of  adverse  income  effects  (differential  in domestic 
demand  growth).  Therefore,  the  third  category  of  factors,  the  supply 
effects,  have  certainly  played  a  major  role  in  these  cases:  the 
catching-up process  implies  a  fast  development of  new  output capacity, 
which  is  not  properly  taken  into  account  in  conventional 
competitiveness indicators. 
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Italy  joined  the  narrow  band  BRM  after  a  8  '  loa&  of  competitiveneas 
durinq  the  year  1989.  During  its  atay  in  this  mechanism  the  real 
exchange rate was  also stable.  The devaluation of the lira,  followed by 
ita withdrawal  from the ERM,  amounted to a  nominal depreciation of  10.8 
'  (measured  as  the  gap  between  the  average  of  the  second  quarter  of 
· 1992  and  the  fourth  quarter  of  1992) •  The  real  depreciation,  which 
amounted  to  11.  3  \,  corresponds  to  an  improvement  of  8  '  for  the 
Italian manufacturing competitiveness with respect to the  bas~ period. 
The  ~  joined  the  wide  band  of  the  ERM  during  the  fourth  quarter  of 
1990,  after  a  period  of  nominal  appreciation  and  wage  slippage,  whose 
combined  effects  since  the  base  period  amounted  to  16  \  of 
competitiveness  losses.  During  its  two  years  of  participation  to  the 
ERM,  its  real  exchange  rate  was  stable.  Since  mid-1992,  the  real 
depreciation  absorbed entirely the previous  losses of  competitiveness. 
Such  real  depreciation  amounted  to  14.4 ,, of  which  13.6  '  came  from 
the nominal  depreciations allowed,  first,  by the use of the wide margin 
of fluctuation and,  next,  by the withdrawal of the pound  from the ERM. 
From  1987  to  the  third  quarter  of  1990,  Greece,  which  is  the  only 
country  whose  currency  has  never  belonged  to  the  ERM,  experienced  a 
27  \  real  appreciatio~,  in  spite  of  a  25  \  nominal  depreciation.  A 
continuation  of  nominal  depreciation,  combined  with  some  wage 
moderation permitted to· register  a  8  \real' depreciation at the end of 
1992  in  comparison  to  the  first  quarter  of  1990,  reducing  the 
cumulative  losses of competitiveness to 16.9 \. - 11  -
4.  DBSCRIPTIOM  OP  RBLBVAft DDDS  Ill  PURCBASDG  POND.  OF  BACH  CURRB1IC!' 
(CDRt's 6  ro 9). 
Traditionally,  another  current  indicator  used  by  analysts  to  assess 
currency prospects  is the relative  inflation  index.  So,  charta  6  to 9 
present  the  relative  consumer  price  indices  measured  in  a  common 
currency,  i.e.  they  correspond  to  the  ratio  of  the  c;:onaumer  price 
indica  in  one  country  to  consumer  price  indices  in  ita  trading 
partners, multiplied by the indica of the nominal exchange rate of this 
country against ita partner.currencies. 
According to this indicator,  the real exchange rate developments  since 
the  Louvre  have  been  leas marked ':  in the  fourth  quarter of  1992  the 
competitive  1laprov-nt of  the  US  economy  amounts  to .some  8  ,, while 
the opposite movement  for the yen is l~ited to 5.6 ,, to 3.6 '  for the 
BC  currencies,  and  to only  1  '  for  the  DK.  However,  compared  to mid-
1989,  real appreciations of the  BC  currencies .and  the  DK  reach  10.5  ' 
and 10.9 '  reape~tively. 
Inside the  BRM,  the same  indicator  shows  that at the'end of  1992,  the 
seven  initial  aaembers  of  the  narrow  ~and of  the  ERK  were  back  very 
close  to their  relative  positions  at  the  beginning  of  1987,  after  a 
peri~ of  several  substantial  real  depreciations  (ranging  from  8.8  ' 
for  Germany  to  4.6  '  for  Denmark).  For  the  five  other  Community 
members,  the  nominal  depreciations that occured during the  second half 
of  the  year  1992  enabled  sOme  of  the  real  appreciations  previously 
recorded  to be  reduced  or eradicated  :  in the  fourth quarter of  1992, 
Italy had relative prices 5.9 '  lower than at the beginning of 1987  and 
British relative prices were  only 2.8 '  higher,  after· a  peak of  21.7  ' 
in 1991.  For Spain,  the real appreciation was  reduced frbm  24  '  to 15.6 
,,  while,  on  the  contrary,  the  real  appreciations  in  Greece  and 
Portugal continued,  reaching respectively 16  \  and  29.5  '  respectively. 
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S.  DBVBLOPMBRTS  IN  RELATIVE  KAJmPACTORING  PROI'ITABILI'l'Y  (CHARTS  10  TO 
12). 
As  explained in section 1,  cost-competitiveness indicators  al~ne cannot 
capture  the  complex  notion  of  competitive  position~  One  of  the  main 
re~sons is the structural difference amongst  industrialized economies, 
particularly relating to the specialization features of each,  which may 
also affect competitiveness  indicators.  Differences  in the  composition 
of  trade  baskets  between  countries  allow  for  differences  in  measured 
relative price without necessarily changing competitive positions  :  for 
example,  even  with  individual  export  prices  perfectly  aligned  with 
those  of- ita  compatitora,  the  maaaurad  index  of  the  relative  export 
price average of one country could rise ..  rely aa a  result of different 
sectoral  compoaition  in its export  basket if the  products  benefitting 
from the largeat international price increaaea have  a  higher weight in 
ita baaket.  In this  example,  such  a  specialization effect  implies  an 
improvement  in  the  terms  of  trade  of  this  country  compared  to  the 
others,  i.e.  an  increase  in  the  disposable  income  which  is 
statistically  registered  as  an  increase  in  the  relative  value  added 
deflator of the manufacturing sector of this country.  This  allows  for 
an  increase  either  in  relative  unit  labour  costs  of  this  country 
without.  This  allows  is  without  any  . squeeze  in  its  profitability 
compared  to  the  other  countries,  or  in  the  relative  profitability 
without  any  change  in  the  relative  ULCM.  In  more  general  terms,  one 
can  say  that  terms  of  trade  variations  across  countries  due  to  the 
differences  in  international  specialization  imply  difference  in 
variation  of  ttle  value  added  deflators,  opening  different  •warranted 
wage  rooms•  .for  existing  output  capacities,  i.e.  divergences  in  unit 
labour  costs  do  not  affect  relative  profitability  insofar  as  they 
coincide with offsetting movements  in relative value-added deflators. 
Consequently,  one  can  better  assess  the  net  impact  of  cost-
competitiveness  and  structural  competitiveness  by  referring  to  the 
relative  evolution  of  the  labour  share  in  manufacturing  value-added, 
i.e.  the ratio of  relative unit  labour  costs  and relative deflators of 
tqe  corresponding  value-added.  The  trend  in this indicator of  relative 
wage  share,  which  gives  implicitly  (its  inverse)  a  relative 
profitability  indicator,  is  represented  in  charts  10  to  12.  However, 
some data for  1991  are still approximate,  and all the data for  1992  $re 
only estimates,  both made  by the Commission  s~rvices  (DG  II). 
Charts  10  and  11  present  the  same  indicator  for  the  other  Community , 
members,  compared  to  their  partners  in  the  ERM.  In  contrast  to  the 
deterioration  for  Germany,  the  Irish  and  French  performances . are 
notable.  Prof it  squeezes  for  the  UK  and  Italy  confirm  some 
•overvaluation•  difficulties,  as  well  as  for  Por~ugal,  Greece  and 
Spain. t  •. 
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6.  COMPARISONS  OF  ALSOLUTB  LBVBLS  OP  TO!'AL  WAGB  COSTS  ARD  PRODUCTIVITY 
(CHARTS  13 ARD  14). 
The  above  presentation  gives  only  relative  evolutions  in  order  to 
assess competitiveness.  However,  competitiveness is also a  question of 
level:  gaps  between  levels  in  the  past  could  justify  catching  up 
evolutions in the period considered,  showing  •deteriorations" which are 
only the paths of real convergence  for  some  countries.  The  question of 
absolute  level  comparison  is  still  open  for  methodological  and 
statistical  problems,  and  one  might  suggest  looking  at  the  absolute 
level  of  wage  costa  for  easily  available  information  on  coat-levels, 
and.comparing it simultaneously to the value added per worker. 
Chart 13 provides these comparisons.  Until 1987,  tbe us  was  the· country 
with  the  highest  level  of  total  wage  costs  per  employee.  In  1992, 
~  and  Belgian workers  have  taken  over.  ~be ranking  of  Community 
ID&IDbera  baa  not  been  changed  since  1987.  Among  the  G-7  countries, 
France maintains  ita rank  at the  third place,  after the  us  level  and 
just before the Japanese  one.  Italy is fifth and  baa  reduced  sOm&what 
ita gap with France.  A partial catching up appears  for  Spain,  also for 
the  UK.  These  two  countries still have  some  catching-up to  do  before 
they  join the top levels.  Of  course,  these wage  gaps also reflect  some 
average productivity level gaps,  as the comparison with the value added 
(at  current  price  and  exchange  rates)  by  employee  shows  (Chart  14) • 
However,  with  the  increase  in  the  mobility  of  capital  and 
entrepreneurship  in  the  Coamunity,  the  existing  average  productivity 
level  gaps  are  not  necessarily  a  constraint  for.  new  investments  and 
activities,  where  there  are  s~ill  some  opportunities  to  reap  the 
benefits of the wage  level gaps. 
An  interesting point  co~cerning the  comparison  of the  absolute  levels 
of  ex-post  productivity  expressed  in  value  is  the  information  that 
could  be tentatively deducted  about  the level of gross profit margins, 
particularly  for  Japan  and  Germany.  Por  JaPan,  its  value  added  by 
worker  is  the  highest  although  its  wage  costs  per  worker  are  not  the 
highest,  indicating  a  higher  gross  profitability  compared  to  its 
competitors.  This ,point  could  confirm the  interpretation that the  room 
for  a  profit squeeze in the Japanese manufacturing  sector - thus  for  a 
real appreciation of the yen  - could still exist.  On  the contrary,  the 
fact  that  German  wage  costs  are the  highest  while  German  productivity 
in value is not,  confirms that the level of  gross profitability in the 
German  manufacturing  sector  does  not  seem  excessive.  In  particular,  a 
bi).at~ral  comparison  with  France  shows  that  wage  costs,  which . were 
already  higher  in  Germany  in  1987. have  increased  more  in Germany  than 
in France,  while the disavantage for Germany  of having  a  level of value 
added  per worker  lower  than  in  France  has  been getting worse  from  1987 
to 1992. 6
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7.  OOIICLUSIC.S. 
Keeping  in  mind  the  e<aplexity  of  a•-••ing  the  evolution  of  the 
relative  caapetitive  position•  of  a  given  group  of  countries,  the 
examination of unit labour coat and profitability indicators would tend 
to point to  ~portant changes in competitiveneaa between the us  and the 
BC  economies  :  the BC  currenciea might  preaently  (end of  1992)  be  seen 
aa overvalued against  ~be dollar. 
Though  overshooting  against  some  eo  called  equilibrium  exchange  rate 
does  not  neceesarily  -an· that  exchange  rate•  are  inappropriate  or 
should  be  adjusted,  one aight  consider that the  Community  currencies, 
viewed  aa  a  bloc,  have  overshot  upwards  (overvaluation)  wbile 
conversely the dollar baa overshot downwards.  The explanation of tbeae 
developments  since  aid-1989  lies  with  divergent  macroeconomic 
conditione on both aides of the Atlantic.  Real exchange rates will tend 
to  be  above  or  below . their  •equilibrium  levels•  to  the  extent  that 
domestic  demand  ia  above  or below  abort-run  potential output.  Tbus  if 
there  is  a  boom  in  domestic  demand  in  a  particular  country  then, 
depending  upon  the  stance  of  monetary  policy  in that  country,  either 
ebort~term intereat rates will rise  (or are expected to rise),  tending 
to  produce  a  nominal  appreciation,  or  inflation  will  accelerate,  or 
both.  In either case,  the  real  exchange  rate will tend to appreciate. 
I 
In  the  longer  run,  however,  since  domestic  demand  cannot  exceed 
productive potential  output  indefinitely,  the  real  exchange  rate will 
tend to depreciat~ towards  the. equilibrium level.  Thus,  in effect,  any 
view  on  the  appropriate  character  of  actual  or  expected  movements  in 
exchange  rates  and  competitiveness  depends  not  so  much  on  whether  the 
exchange rate is •overvalued"  or  "undervalued."  as  on the assessment  of 
the balance  ~etween domestic demand  and short-run potential output. 
In this perspective,  the  "overvaluation"  of the real exchange  rates of 
the Community  countries vis-A-vis other industrialized countries,  which 
emerged  in  1990  and  1991,  can  be  viewed  as  the  result  of  different 
(actual  and  anticipated)  cyclical  developments  between  the  Community 
(and,  more  particularly,  the economy  of the ERM's  ·anchor  currency)  and 
its  industrial  partners.  This  cyclical  divergence  appears  to  have 
fostered both the emergence of interest-rate differentials in ~favour of 
the  European  currencies. and  of  a  relatively  high  inflation  rate  in 
Europe.  The  monetary  pc>licies  that  were  at  the  root  of  this  joint 
development  were,  at  least  as  far  as  ERM  currencies  were  concerned, 
considered appropriate by the central banks. 
In  1992,  in  spite  of  the  cyclical  deterioration  in  Europe,  the 
postponement  of  the. narrowing  in  interest  rate  differentials  between 
the COmmunity  and the us  was,  at least partly,  due to a  combination of 
wage  slippage  in  Germany  and  a  frustrated  recovery  of  the  American 
economy.  Presently,  it  seems  that  current  and  prospective  cyclical 
developments  in  the  COmmunity  and  the  US  have  led  to  market 
expectations  of  a  narrowing  of.  interest  rate  differentials,  thus 
fuelling  a  strengthening  of  the  dollar  against  Community  currencies. 
This  nominal  depreciation  of  the  Eur~pean  currencies  seems  to  be 
warranted by the recent shift in the balance of risks between inflation 
and recession,  and  could help the European cyclical recovery. - 15 -
As  raqarda  the  zen,  the  atrong  real  appreciation  observed  along  the 
eighties  appears  to  be  warranted  by  the  initial  big  profitability 
premium of the Japaneae manufacturing aector.  Por the near  future,  as 
the  technological  and  atructural  advantage•  of .Japan  seem  to  pr~reaa 
further,  the yen does not  seem to be overvalued,  and one  should expect 
4 
a.  ·continued  appreciation,  at  least  against  Community  currencies.  The 
ongoing  real  appreciation  of  the  yen,  which  baa  been  observed  since 
mid-1990,  corresponds  to  a  correction  of  the  prolonged  decline 
registered  from  the  beginning  of  1989  to the  aecond  quarter  of  1990. 
The G-7  aeama  to have played a  role in making the markets  aware of the 
undervaluation  of  the  yen  at  a  time  when  intereat  rate differentials 
and  difficulties in the Japaneae  financial  ayatem  were  acting  against 
an appreciation of thia currency. 
As  for the Community  currenciea,  taken  into account,  on  the one  hand, 
the reaulta  from  the trade  performance•  unexplained  by  income  effects 
(aection  2)  and  the  competitiveness  analyals  on  the  other,  the 
fol.lowing  aaaeasment can be proposed  a 
Germany,  Greece,  Italy  and  the  UK  have  obviously  reoistered  a 
competitiveness  deterioration until·· the third quarter of  1992.  For 
Italy and  the  UK,  the depreciation  of their  nominal  exchange  rates 
has  probably  offset  the  previous  relative  coat  slippages.  For 
Germany,  the  realignments  and  the  suspensions  of  ERM  participation 
that  took  place  in  the  third  and  fourth  quarter  of  1992  have 
contributed  to  a  significant  increase  in  this  country• s  relative 
prices  1 
.Spain  and  Portugal  have  registered  a  rather  important  increase  in 
their relative prices,  as it is typical  in any  catching  up process. 
However,  two  question-marks  remain  :  whether or not  the chosen  base 
period  is  appropriate  for  these  countries,  and  wether  or  not  the 
losses  of  competitiveness  of existing output are  being  incurred too 
fast; 
Ireland,  France  and  Denmark  enjoy  a  rather  healthy  competitiveness 
position,  while  the  Netherlands  and  Belgium,  arguably,  do  not  face 
any problems  in this field. 
All  in all, it would  appear that the  1993  ERM  parity grid seems  more  in 
line and with the underlying  fundamentals  of the Member  States involved 
than,it was  the case in 1992. 